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1. Introduction
Over the last few decades, the radical right in Western
Europe has managed to emerge, develop, and increase
its electoral weight in numerous countries. Some of
these parties have even entered coalition governments.
The increased government radical right parties in govern-
ments has prompted scholars to explore the question of
mainstreaming (Akkerman, de Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016).
The inclusion-moderation thesis states that radical right
parties become more like mainstream parties once they
participate in government. Apart from a moderation of
issue positions, this expectation refers to a reduction in
terms of populism. Regarding the latter, the state of the
art reveals inconclusive findings. In this article, I propose
focusing on the role of party leadership in order to exam-
ine the inclusion-moderation thesis in a more nuanced
way. The main theoretical contribution of this article is
the distinction between traditional andmanagerial party
leadership of radical right parties in office. While tradi-
tional leadership employs an adversarial strategy toward
mainstream parties, the latter favors an accommodative
strategy. This article looks at three phases: 1) the oppo-
sition period; 2) in office under traditional party leader-
ship; and 3) in office under managerial party leadership.
When compared to the second phase when it is in office
under traditional party leadership, I expect that the radi-
cal right’s level of populism will be higher during the op-
position period and lower when it is in office under man-
agerial party leadership.
I illustrate my theoretical argument by focusing on
the Geneva Citizens’Movement (MCG) from Switzerland.
Located in the Canton of Geneva, this regional radical
right party has rather successfully relied on continu-
ous mobilization against cross-border commuters from
neighboring France. I selected this case because theMCG
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has experienced the three phases of interest in chrono-
logical order in its short history so far. Indeed, it was first
in the opposition (from 2005 to 2013, Phase 1), then in
office under traditional party leadership (from 2013 to
2016, Phase 2), and finally in office under managerial
party leadership (since 2016, Phase 3). Based on a quanti-
tative analysis of theMCG’s newspaper, I show that, com-
pared to the second phase, where the party was in office
under traditional leadership, the party relied more fre-
quently on populism in the first phase when it was in the
opposition and less so in the third phase where it was in
office under managerial leadership. These results are in
line with my theoretical argument.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.
Section 2 develops the theoretical argument by propos-
ing that the radical right relies on varying levels of pop-
ulism depending on the phase it is in. Section 3 fo-
cuses on the MCG’s trajectory by chronologically outlin-
ing the three main phases the party experienced since
its foundation. Section 4 describes the documents se-
lected for the empirical analysis as well as the construc-
tion of the indicators. Section 5 presents the findings of
my investigation using both descriptive and inferential
statistics. Finally, Section 6 briefly summarizes the key
findings of this contribution and embeds them into a
larger context.
2. The Role of Party Leadership
Over the last few decades, parties from the radical right
have emerged, developed, and increased their electoral
weight across Western Europe (Mudde, 2013). In addi-
tion to having firmly established themselves in the polit-
ical landscape of a large number of countries, some of
them even managed to enter national and subnational
governments. Once considered political pariahs by main-
streamparties, the radical right has increasingly emerged
as a potential coalition partner in recent years (Biard,
Bernhard, & Betz, 2019). Some prominent examples in-
clude the government participation of parties such as
the Austrian Freedom Party, the Finns, the Norwegian
Progress Party, and the League in Italy.
The widespread inclusion of the radical right in gov-
ernments, among other issues, has prompted scholars to
question the concept of mainstreaming (Akkerman et al.,
2016). According to the inclusion-moderation thesis (see
Tepe, in press, for an overview of its original meaning),
parties from the radical right should become more like
mainstream parties once theymove from the opposition
to government. Scholars have begun to test this theo-
retical expectation by examining two key dimensions of
mainstreaming: the moderation of issue positions and
the decline of populism. In the case of Western Europe,
it appears that the government participation of the rad-
ical right did not generally lead to its ideological moder-
ation. However, there is evidence that it became more
mainstream with respect to European integration issues
(Akkerman et al., 2016).
As to populism (and more generally anti-establish-
ment attitudes and behavior), no conclusive evidence
has emerged from the few comparative studies so far
(Akkerman et al., 2016; Albertazzi, 2009). This suggests
that government participation does not always reduce
the radical right’s reliance on populism. In this context,
the study by Albertazzi (2009) shows that, when in office,
the radical right can exhibit behavior that is similar to its
behaviorwhile in the opposition and that it can resort to a
division of labor between responsible government mem-
bers and de facto oppositional party leaders. Based on
these considerations, I expect that the strategies adopted
by government parties of the radical right play a crucial
role in the extent to which they resort to populism.
The following analysis will focus on the dimension
of populism by highlighting the role of party leadership.
I will discuss the radical right’s level of populism by distin-
guishing between three phases: Phase 1) the opposition
period; Phase 2) in office under traditional party leader-
ship; and Phase 3) in office under managerial party lead-
ership. As compared to Phase 2, I argue that the radical
right exhibits higher levels of populism during Phase 1
and lower levels during Phase 3.
The academic literature identifies populism, author-
itarianism (i.e., belief in a strictly ordered society, in
which infringements of authority should be severely pun-
ished), and nativism (i.e., the view that the sensibilities
and needs of the ‘native-born’ should be given absolute
priority over those of newcomers) as major characteris-
tics of the radical right (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2015;
Rydgren, 2013). Populism considers society to be divided
into two antagonistic groups: the vast majority of virtu-
ous people and the elites that pursues its own interest
(Mudde, 2004).
In the opposition period (Phase 1), it is reasonable to
expect that radical right parties rely heavily on populism
by mobilizing ordinary citizens around a common set of
grievances and resentments that provide them with a
sense of a shared identity as the genuine and authentic
‘people’ who are pitted against the elites in general and
the government in particular (Betz & Bernhard, 2019).
The radical right typically accuses the elites of putting in-
ternationalism ahead of the nation and ahead of the in-
terests of the ‘people,’ who are defined in ethnic terms
(Mény & Surel, 2000). The radical right claims that it rep-
resents the ‘common sense’ of ordinary people and that
it will restore their voice, thereby promising that political
decisions will become the true expression of the popu-
lar will.
Scholars have emphasized that radical right parties
are frequently organized around a strong and internally
uncontested leader (e.g., Taggart, 2000). Indeed, the rad-
ical right is currently the party family that is most of-
ten associatedwith personalistic parties (Schedler, 1996).
Radical right parties are thus heavily dependent on their
leader for conveying their populist messages. In order to
draw the attention of the media and citizens, this leader
must not fear intentionally relying on provocations that
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challenge the formal and informal rules of the demo-
cratic game.
Due to their pronounced populist mobilization, elec-
torally successful radical right parties face a major inter-
nal challenge when sharing power with mainstream par-
ties in office. Given that the radical right mobilizes or-
dinary citizens against established elites that they hold
responsible for all their grievances, close and visible co-
operation with mainstream parties may be seen as a be-
trayal of its core beliefs by substantial parts of its party
members (Heinisch, 2003; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016).
Unlike this traditional adversarial approach, more prag-
matic party members may prefer to settle for policy com-
promise by pursuing a more accommodative strategy
toward mainstream parties. This tension may become
particularly visible when office holders take actions and
make public statements that contradict the official posi-
tions of the party (Harmel & Svåsand, 1993).
While the electoral growth in the opposition period
typically builds around a strong leader that dominates
the party, this may not be the case in the second phase.
Once the radical party is in office and participates in gov-
ernment, it likely forms a second center of power, a man-
agerial wing, which is articulated by the members of gov-
ernment (Mazzoleni, 1999, 2010). Within a radical right
party that is in office, there may thus be a separation be-
tween the party leader on the one hand and the office
holders on the other. Due to diverging party strategies,
this setting may rapidly incite internal conflicts. Theman-
agerial wing may want to abandon the unconventional
style and unpredictable behavior of the party leader and
his/her entourage, thus preferring a more credible and
trustworthy person at the head of the party who will put
more emphasis on cooperating with mainstream parties.
Hence, the period of government participation is likely
to be marked by factionalism, which can lead to sharp
conflicts and may ultimately even lead to a split that
separates pragmatic from the more oppositional forces
(Heinisch, 2003; Luther, 2011). A great deal of party-
internal coordination is thus required to cope with this
challenge (Harmel & Svåsand, 1993).
I will now argue that the level of populism displayed
by radical right parties in office depends on which fac-
tion gains control of the party (for the sake of simplic-
ity, I do not account for an intermediate variant, which
refers to a power-sharing solution between the two fac-
tions, which could be labelled as ‘dual leadership’). If the
traditional figure and his/her entourage manage to con-
tinue to assume party leadership (Phase 2), then the rad-
ical right will rely on a pronounced degree of populism.
This is due to the fact that it will basically maintain its ad-
versarial strategy toward mainstream parties. However,
it is expected that it will pursue a lower level of populism
than during the opposition period (Phase 1). This is be-
cause the party leadership has to account for the wishes
of the managerial wing (i.e., pragmatic forces in general
and the government members in particular), at least to
some degree.
I expect that there will be a greater reduction of
populism if the managerial wing takes control of radical
right parties in office (Phase 3). This can be attributed
to the fact that the new leadership may want to aban-
don its transformative aspirations in order to detoxify its
image as an unreliable party, thus becoming a more ac-
ceptable partner to mainstream parties. Rather than an
ideological moderation, such a leadership change would
entail a break with the initial adversarial approach di-
rected against the political establishment in the name of
the ‘people.’
To summarize, I posit that the levels of populism by
the radical right differ according to the aforementioned
three phases. I expect that the highest level of populism
occurs during Phase 1, in opposition, followedby Phase 2,
in office under traditional party leadership, and Phase 3,
in office under managerial party leadership. In other
words, I expect that in Phase 2, in office under traditional
party leadership, there will be an intermediate level of
populism. Hence, the hypothesis states:
As compared to the phase when it is in office un-
der traditional party leadership (Phase 2), the radical
right’s level of populism is higher during its time in op-
position (Phase 1) and lower when it is in office under
managerial party leadership (Phase 3).
3. The Trajectory of the MCG
This hypothesis will be tested using the case of a regional
radical right party from Switzerland—theMCG. I decided
to select this party because it has experienced the above-
mentioned three phases chronologically since its foun-
dation in 2005. The first phase (until 2013) includes the
MCG’s opposition period during which it experienced
a spectacular electoral ascent thanks to its traditional
leader, Eric Stauffer. The second phase (from 2013 to
2016) started with the election of Mauro Poggia, a prag-
matic member of the party, to the cantonal government.
In this phase, the party remained under the traditional
party leadership of Stauffer’s entourage, while witness-
ing the rise of a managerial wing around Poggia. Despite
diverging views over the party’s strategy, the two fac-
tions managed to get along fine for three years. In 2016,
however, a major dispute occurred during the party pres-
ident elections leading Stauffer to quit the MCG. This
event marked the beginning of the third phase, in which
the managerial wing took control of the party.
Before addressing the MCG’s trajectory, I would like
to briefly provide some basic information about the
party, given that it has received little scholarly atten-
tion so far. The MCG operates in the Canton of Geneva,
whose territory is mostly surrounded by France. This pe-
culiarity, coupled with the economic attractiveness of
Geneva and the Agreement on the Free Movement of
Persons between the European Union and Switzerland,
have led to a sharp increase in cross-border commuters
from neighboring France in recent years. This situation
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has provided the MCG with fertile ground for creat-
ing a successful populist mobilization. Using the slogan
“Geneva and Genevans first,” the party claims to be nei-
ther left nor right. Its cultural differentialism (Betz, 2004;
Betz & Johnson, 2004) manifests itself in a regional form
by discriminating between people from Geneva, on the
one hand, and cross-border commutes from France, on
the other. However, the party’s economic position is
much more ambivalent. The MCG tends to embrace lib-
eralism on financial policies by pleading for tax cuts and
budgetary discipline. At the same time, it regularly sup-
ports an expansion of the welfare state, which distin-
guishes it from the Swiss People’s Party, the largest rad-
ical right party in Switzerland (Bernhard et al., 2015;
Mazzoleni, 2008).
3.1. Opposition Period (Phase 1)
The MCG was founded in June 2005 in the run-up to
the cantonal elections. Two local politicians, Georges
Letellier and Eric Stauffer, were the driving forces behind
the party’s establishment. Letellier, a native Frenchman,
served as the party’s first president. The MCG immedi-
ately met with success. In the October 2005 elections
for the cantonal parliament, the party managed to sur-
pass the electoral threshold of 7%. The MCG made its
entrance to the Grand Council by obtaining nine out
of 100 seats. Considering that the party had only been
founded four months earlier, and that it counted with
no more than 30 members within its ranks, many ob-
servers described the MCG’s 7.7% vote share as a sen-
sation. During the campaign that preceded the vote, the
party employed an aggressive tone. Indeed, it pledged to
“wipe away cross-border commuters, the political estab-
lishment, and criminals” (Béguin, 2007, p. 125).
In 2006, a major quarrel erupted within the MCG.
Letellier opposed the virulent anti-French xenophobia
pursued by the party (Béguin, 2007, p. 129). This con-
flict led to his resignation and his decision to leave the
party altogether. In the following years, Stauffer and
some close associates took control of the MCG. George
Jost (2006–2008), Stauffer (2008–2012), and RogerGolay
(2012–2016) assumed party leadership in the following
years. Stauffer not only established himself as the heart
and soul of the party, but he also quickly became the
enfant terrible of Genevan politics. Due to his extraordi-
nary communication skills, he managed to become ubiq-
uitous in the local media. Tomany inhabitants of Geneva,
he hit the nail on the head by forcefully blaming cross-
border commuters from France for their daily problems.
Stauffer attracted a great deal of attention by point-
ing out the malfunctioning of public companies. In part
due to insider information, he targeted the Geneva
Industrial Services (SIG), a state-controlled infrastruc-
ture company where he was a member of the Board
of Directors. Stauffer denounced abuses in terms of ex-
ecutive pay and excessive electricity prices. As a result,
the company was forced to scale back in both respects.
In 2008, Stauffer also succeeded in forcing the SIG to
renounce importing waste from Naples on the grounds
that this transaction would have led to a questionable
relationship between the Camorra and the industrial ser-
vices of the Canton of Geneva. In the Grand Council,
Stauffer obtained abundant media coverage by repeat-
edly paralyzing parliamentary business through filibus-
tering tactics and the submission of an excessive num-
ber of amendments. Additionally, cantonal MPs felt com-
pelled to passing a weapons ban in the assembly, given
that Stauffer carried a handgun in his everyday life.
In 2009, the party continued its electoral ascent.
Thanks to a vote share of 14.7%, it almost doubled its
representation (17 MPs) in the Grand Council. The MCG
succeeded in setting the agenda of the election cam-
paign. In addition to using cross-border commuters from
neighboring France as a scapegoat, the party focused
on urban security issues. After a bloody fight between
drug dealers occurred in the city of Geneva, members of
the MCG were quick to capitalize on public discontent
by taking to the streets. In the following years, Stauffer
frequently continued to make headlines. In 2010, some
of the MCG’s billboards created diplomatic tensions be-
tween Switzerland and Libya in the context of a federal
direct-democratic vote on the deportation of criminal for-
eigners. In 2012, Stauffer attracted a great deal of at-
tention by throwing a glass of water onto a politician
from the Liberals who had verbally provoked him in the
Grand Council.
In 2013, the MCG emerged as the big winner of the
cantonal elections. With 19.2% of the vote, the party ob-
tained 20 seats in the Grand Council. The party proba-
bly benefitted from the fact that law and order issues
ranked high in voters’ minds, given that the murder of a
young woman had occurred just one month before elec-
tion day. In any case, theMCG stuck to its core issues dur-
ing the campaign. Following the publication of an article
in the party’s newspaper, in which the president and the
secretary described cross-border commuters as an “epi-
demic that is by far not eradicated” (Golay & Baertschi,
2013), the International League against Racism and Anti-
Semitism urged the cantonal government to intervene.
A video Stauffer posted on YouTube also caused quite a
stir. The party leader stated that drug trafficking had es-
tablished itself in Geneva under the helpless gaze of the
judicial authorities.
3.2. In Office under Traditional Party Leadership
(Phase 2)
In November 2013, the MCG experienced another ma-
jor success. Mauro Poggia, a pragmatic member of the
party, was elected to the seven-member government of
the Canton of Geneva by taking a seat from the Greens.
Poggia, an advocate who specialized in the defense of in-
sured people, and formerly a member of the Christian
Democrats, had joined the MCG in 2009 in the run-up
to the cantonal elections. When in government, Poggia
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took over the newly created portfolio of Employment,
Social Affairs, and Health. This allowed the MCG to ex-
ert some direct influence in terms of policy-making. The
party’s increased power was probably most visible in the
labor market domain. Under the decisive pressure of the
MCG, the Canton of Geneva had already introduced the
so-called ‘cantonal preference’ legislation in 2012. This
legislation prioritizes local unemployed people when
there are job vacancies within the cantonal administra-
tion and state-controlled companies, such as public trans-
port, the airport, the university hospital, and industrial
services. In November 2014, Poggia announced that this
schemewould be extended to the 250 organizations that
receive subsidies from the Canton of Geneva (e.g., retire-
ment homes, cultural institutions, and charities).
Detractors forecasted that the MCG would not suc-
ceed in reconciling Poggia’s contained temper with Eric
Stauffer’s exuberance. At first glance, it hardly seemed
imaginable that two such distinct characters would be
able to work closely together. However, the so-called
‘Poggia–Stauffer duo’ harmonized well, at least in the be-
ginning. Indeed, the fact that the MCG managed to re-
main united for three years was commonly attributed to
successful internal coordination. The party relied on a di-
vision of roles between Stauffer’s entourage and Poggia’s
growing number of followers. The latter were granted a
discretionary degree of freedom from the official party
line, which allowed the office holder to act responsibly
and loyally to the other members of government from
the mainstream parties. Stauffer and its entourage, for
their part, basically remained responsive to their elec-
torate by relying on their traditional, predominantly ad-
versarial approach. The party continued to actively mo-
bilize citizens against cross-border commuters by launch-
ing referendums and initiatives challenging the govern-
ment’s position, among others.
A local journalist observed that the MCG’s two most
prominent figures skillfully played on the same partition
in public: “When Stauffer lights the fire, Poggia waters
it down” (Le Temps, 2015). This division of roles also
worked within the party, as illustrated at the 2015 an-
nual party meeting when Poggia made the point that the
economy would still need cross-border commuters even
if all local unemployed people were hired. While party
members greeted these words with sustained applause,
not all of them were expressing approval for the same
thing that evening. Some activists—undoubtedly adher-
ents to the managerial wing—welcomed Poggia’s prag-
matic words, whereas supporters of Stauffer’s more or-
thodox approach focused on the preferential treatment
of local unemployed people, a key demand of the party
since its existence (Le Temps, 2015).
3.3. In Office under Managerial Party Leadership
(Phase 3)
The party’s latent division turned into open conflict in
Spring 2015, when the electoral fortune of theMCG took
an unexpected turn toward the worst: The party failed to
gain ground in local elections. As the party suffered its
first set-back in its short history, internal rivalries quickly
broke out. Several party figures publicly criticized Poggia
for some of his statements and decisions, which they
claimed had gone against the MCG’s position. Others
criticized Stauffer’s authoritarian, egocentric, narcissis-
tic, and even manipulative de facto leadership.
Most importantly, a major dispute with far-reaching
consequences emerged as a result of the 2016 party pres-
ident elections. In the framework of the annual party
meeting, held in camera on 29 April, Ana Roch, a close
associate of Poggia’s, was elected by a margin of only
one vote against Stauffer, the party’s honorary president.
Stauffers’ defeat meant that his influence on the party’s
strategic decisions would decidedly diminish. Following
that event, he decided to leave the party and to sit in the
Grand Council as an independent. In September 2017,
Stauffer announced the foundation of a newparty, which
several former members of the MCG joined. Its name,
Genève En Marche! (GEM; Geneva on the Move!), was
reminiscent of Emmanuel Macron’s successful campaign
to become French president.
It is worth noting that the MCG did not change its
ideological profile after Stauffer’s departure. Indeed, the
party program has remained the same. Pundits simply
observed that the MCG turned slightly to the left on eco-
nomic issues. This was most visible in the domains of
public finances and in the defence of the civil servants’
interests. Without its enfant terrible, the party experi-
enced a marked loss in media attention. This loss, to-
gether with the fact that three radical right parties com-
peted for citizens’ votes, did not bode well for the 2018
cantonal elections. As expected, the MCG experienced a
resounding defeat. With a vote share of only 9.4%, the
party lost nine of its 20 seats in the Grand Council. Party
figures could at least take comfort in the fact that the
MCG fared better than its direct competitors from the
Swiss People’s Party (7.3%) and GEM (4.1%). As the latter
failed to pass the threshold into the cantonal parliament,
Stauffer announced the dissolution of the newly created
party on Election Day. In addition, Poggia was comfort-
ably re-elected to the Council of States.
Despite the MCG’s electoral backlash, Roch man-
aged to keep the party presidency in 2018. After her
re-election, she declared that after two difficult years,
during which the credibility of the MCG nevertheless in-
creased among the other parties, the party had to pur-
sue a strategy of openness and stability (Bretton, 2018).
The party maintained this accommodative strategy un-
der Francisco Valentin, the current party leader who was
elected in 2019.
4. Data and Operationalization
The empirical part of this article is based on a quanti-
tative content analysis of the MCG’s party newspaper
Le Citoyen (The Citizen). I chose this source as it is the
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only type of document that proved to be available for
a period that encompasses the three phases being an-
alyzed. The party distributes this publication among its
members and to a broader audience at irregular inter-
vals through canvassing activities and direct mailings, es-
pecially in the run-up to elections and direct-democratic
votes. The number of issues per year ranges from one
to four. This empirical investigation encompasses a pe-
riod of almost ten years and includes 25 newspapers
published by the MCG between September 2008 and
February 2018. I gathered these documents from the
Library of Geneva, the long-serving party secretary as
well as from the MCG’s website. However, I must note
that I failed to collect at least three editions. Indeed, the
first editions of Le Citoyen that were published before
September 2008 do not appear in this investigation, nor
do the newspapers from Spring 2010 and Spring 2012.
Among the available documents, I selected articles that
comprehensively address a given political issue at the
cantonal or federal level. As a result, the number of ar-
ticles included in this study is 167.
The dependent variable of this study, populism,
was operationalized using indicators based on Mudde’s
(2004, p. 543) influential definition. This definition views
populismas an ideology that considers that society is sep-
arated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups—
the pure people versus the corrupt elites—and that pos-
tulates that the will of the former must always prevail.
While conceived as an ideology, it is now widely ac-
cepted among scholars that populism manifests itself
in the discursive patterns of political actors (Hawkins &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). In
this manifestation, political communication can be an-
alyzed to empirically capture populism (Aalberg, Esser,
Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). In other
words, this analysis proposes examining the extent to
which political actors appeal to the people, denigrate
the elites, emphasize the antagonismbetween these two
groups, and call for popular sovereignty.
In order to measure populist communication, I ac-
count for the four core elements of Mudde’s definition:
i.e., 1) people-centrism; 2) anti-elitism; 3) calls for popu-
lar sovereignty; and 4) the antagonistic relationship be-
tween people and elites (see Bernhard, 2017). The con-
tent analysis consists of an assessment at the article
level. For each of the four populist components of inter-
est, a dichotomous indicator is utilized. More specifically,
I employ the following coding criteria. People-centrism
is coded as ‘1’ if a given political actor portrays the peo-
ple (or functional equivalents such as ‘the population,’
‘the citizens,’ or ‘Genevans’) as a homogeneous unity.
Regarding anti-elitism, the value of ‘1’ is assigned if ac-
tors, such as the government in its entirety or the busi-
ness community as a whole, are characterized in a funda-
mentally negative manner. As to popular sovereignty, de-
mands for more power to the people, or the rejection of
a loss of the people’s power, take the values of ‘1.’ Finally,
the antagonistic relationship between people and elites
are coded as ‘1’ if there are statements that highlight a
sharp conflict or an insurmountable clash of interests be-
tween people and elites. The coding work was carried
out by a native French speaker. A separate reliability test
was performed, which was based on 56 randomly se-
lected articles (i.e., roughly a third of the total number),
and itsmain result turned out to be satisfactory (the com-
bined Cohen’s Kappa amounts to 0.86).
When applying this coding scheme, it appears that
the MCG most frequently made use of demands for
people-centrism. This indicator proved to be present
in slightly more than every third newspaper article
(0.34). Indications of anti-elitism were apparent in one
out of five documents (0.19), while antagonistic state-
ments (0.11), and demands for popular sovereignty
(0.08) turned out to be far less pervasive.
As a reviewer rightly pointed out, a multiplication
of these four indicators is indicated from a theoretical
point of view. In line with Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser
(2013, p. 151), it appears obvious to argue that all indica-
tors need to be present in order to qualify as populism.
However, such an encompassing co-occurrence was only
the case in 19 out of the 167 articles included in this
analysis. Due to this low level of variation, it was impos-
sible to estimate the multivariate models presented in
Section 5.2. Therefore, I decided to opt for an additive
aggregation method, provided that the four populism in-
dicators form a single dimension. To verify the dimen-
sionality question, I rely on the Mokken scale analysis, a
hierarchical scaling method that assumes the presence
of an underlying latent attribute, which is represented
by a set of observable items (van Schuur, 2003). Table 1
shows that the four populism indicators tend to occur to-
gether. Given that these indicators form a strong hierar-
chical scale (Loevinger’s H coefficient amounts to 0.56), it
is indicated to construct a composite measure by adding
the four items. The populist communication index (PCI)
thus ranges from 0 to 4, with a mean score of 0.72 and
Table 1.Mokken scale analysis of the populism indicators (N = 167).
Share of documents in which indicator is present H-coefficient (scalability, maximum = 1)
People-centrism 0.34 0.57
Anti-elitism 0.19 0.51
Antagonism 0.11 0.58
Popular sovereignty 0.08 0.58
Scale 0.56
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a substantial variance across the articles under investiga-
tion (s.d. = 1.05).
Regarding the independent variable, I assigned the
167 selected articles to one of the three phases of in-
terest. Based on the dates of publication, this resulted
in the construction of three dummy variables. Eighty-
five articles refer to the opposition period (Phase 1),
as they were published before the election of Poggia
to the Council of States of Geneva, 34 articles concern
the phase of government participation under traditional
party leadership, which lasted from December 2013 to
April 2016 (Phase 2), and 48 articles cover the phase
of the party in office under managerial party leadership
(Phase 3).
With respect to the control variables, I propose ac-
counting for the influence of issue domains, campaigns,
and authorship. All indicators are dichotomous in nature.
The classification of issue domains relies on the work
of Kriesi et al. (2008). The economic dimension includes
economic policies, welfare state issues, and finances. In
contrast, topics related to cultural liberalism, European
integration, education, immigration, the army, and secu-
rity fall under the cultural dimension. In addition, there
is a residual category of issues that cannot be clearly as-
signed to either of these two domains (i.e., ecology, in-
stitutional reforms, and infrastructure). With respect to
the campaigns, I separately account for election contexts
and direct-democratic votes. For the former, articles pub-
lished within the last eight weeks before election day are
considered to belong to the campaign period in the case
of federal or cantonal elections. For the latter, newspa-
per articles take the value of ‘1’ if they deal with a refer-
endum or an initiative that was submitted to the ballot
either at the federal or at the cantonal level. As far as
authorship is concerned, I distinguish between the indi-
vidual and the collective level. The articles signed by in-
dividuals are coded as ‘1’ and editorial contributions are
coded as ‘0.’
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Among the three phases considered here, the highest
mean PCI level (M = 1.00) occurs during Phase 1 (i.e.,
the opposition period). In contrast, the lowest level
(M = 0.27) appears in Phase 3 (i.e., in office under man-
agerial party leadership). The difference is considerable
given that the party played the populist card almost four
times less frequently than in the first phase. In Phase 2
(i.e., in office under traditional leadership), the level of
the MCG’s (M = 0.67) populist communication is be-
tween that of Phase 1 and Phase 3. These descriptive fig-
ures are thus in line with the hypothesis.
I now briefly present some descriptive statistics per-
taining to the control variables. At first glance, it seems
that levels of populist communication do not vary much
according to issues. When looking at the level of issue
domains, it turns out that from 2008 to 2018, the MCG
did not rely on cultural populism more frequently than
on economic populism (PCI of 0.70 vs. 0.68), thus con-
firming previous research (Bernhard, 2017). Apart from
that, the average PCI level for the residual issue cate-
gory is 0.85. When deconstructing the populist commu-
nication of the MCG for each main category, the party
excels on a single issue. On the cultural dimension, this
issue is immigration (M = 1.33), with a focus on cross-
border commuters. In the economic domain, the high-
est score is attained for economic policies (M = 0.95).
In this respect, the MCG frequently relies on populist
statements when addressing the maladministration of
state-controlled companies. As to the residual category,
the party frequently employs populist appeals on institu-
tional reforms (M = 1.18) above all else. This communi-
cation occurs on various isolated topics (e.g., extending
direct-democratic rights, fighting lobbyism, and protect-
ing the competences of the Canton of Geneva within the
Swiss Confederation).
In terms of the campaign context, the distinction
between election and non-election periods does not
seem to influence the MCG’s degree of populist com-
munication (0.65 vs. 0.79). However, the articles that re-
late to direct-democratic votes achieve somewhat higher
levels on the PCI than the remaining ones (0.92 vs.
0.65). Authorship, for its part, does not seem to matter.
Newspaper articles signed by MCG party members are
only slightly more populist than the editorial contribu-
tions (0.82 vs. 0.68). When I also examine the various
authors of the articles under investigation, it becomes
obvious that Stauffer outclasses the remaining party fig-
ures in terms of populist communication. His average
PCI score is 2.00. The remaining individuals who wrote
at least five articles attained the following PCI scores:
Stauffer is followed by François Baertschi (1.29), Roger
Golay (0.85), and Mauro Poggia (0.43). It is worth noting
that the articles authored by the remaining individuals
display very low levels of populist communication (0.18).
5.2. Inferential Statistics
In order to test whether the aforementioned descrip-
tive patterns stand up to a multivariate analysis, I rely
on ordered probit regressions. The results on the phases
presented in Table 2 tend to support the hypothesis. As
is visible from the first model, there is evidence that
the MCG relied on populist communication more fre-
quently during its initial opposition period (Phase 1) than
when it assumed office under traditional party leader-
ship (Phase 2). In addition, the significative negative coef-
ficient for Phase 3 indicates that the party adopted lower
levels of populist communication when it was in office
under managerial party leadership compared to Phase 2,
the reference category. These findings suggest that the
second phasewas characterized by an intermediate level
of populism, which is in line with my theoretical argu-
ment. However, there is a caveat. Unlike the coefficient
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Table 2. Ordered probit regression model explaining the MCG’s levels of populist communication.
Model I Model II
Opposition period 0.504 ** 0.499 **
(Phase 1) (2.04) (2.02)
In office under managerial −0.620 * −0.108
party leadership (Phase 3) (−1.94) (−0.27)
Economic issues −0.048 0.129
(−0.22) (0.54)
Other issues 0.273 0.196
(1.08) (0.77)
Election context 0.149 0.056
(0.74) (0.27)
Direct-democratic vote 0.317 0.342
(1.53) (1.63)
Individual author −0.124 −0.050
(−0.59) (−0.24)
Phase 3 × economic issues −0.971 **
(−2.00)
Cut 1 0.422 0.478
(1.46) (1.64)
Cut 2 1.310 *** 1.377 ***
(4.33) (4.50)
Cut 3 1.812 *** 1.884 ***
(5.62) (5.78)
Cut 4 2.147 *** 2.221 ***
(6.30) (6.45)
N 167 167
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.073
Notes: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; z-values in brackets. Reference groups: in office under traditional party leadership (Phase 2)
and cultural issues (for issue domains).
of Phase 1, the one of Phase 3 narrowly misses the 5%
error level normally used in regression estimations. In
other words, the difference in populism levels between
Phase 2 and Phase 3 is rather weakly secured from a sta-
tistical point of view.
I now comment on the influence of the control vari-
ables. The model confirms that the party does not more
frequently resort to populism on economic issues than
on cultural ones. At the level of single issues, further anal-
yses (not shown here) reveal that the populist rhetoric
of the MCG tends to prevail when immigration, institu-
tional reforms, and economic issues are at stake. With
respect to campaigns, electoral periods are not found
to increase the party’s reliance on populist appeals. The
same holds true for direct-democratic votes, thus con-
tradicting the impression obtained from the descriptive
analysis. Finally, the party’s level of populist communica-
tion does not prove to be related to authorship. Hence,
articles signed by individuals do not differentiate them-
selves from editorial contributions. Additional estima-
tion models also accounted for individual party figures
(i.e., Eric Stauffer, Roger Golay, François Baertschi, and
Mauro Poggia). However, no single coefficient turned out
to be significant. The absence of a positive finding at the
individual level supports the conclusion that the MCG’s
level of populist communication primarily depended on
the phase it was in during its short history.
Finally, a reviewer suggested testing the interaction
between issue domains and the third phase. The ratio-
nale for this idea stems from the fact that the MCG is
said to have moved slightly to the left on economic is-
sues since the managerial wing took over party leader-
ship (see Section 3.3). In the secondmodel in Table 2, the
significant negative coefficient of the interaction term
between economic issues and Phase 3 shows that the
party’s decline in populist communication during Phase 3
was particularly discernible on economic issues.
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6. Conclusion
Over the last few decades, several parties from the rad-
ical right have managed to enter national and subna-
tional governments in Western Europe. Inspired by the
inclusion-moderation thesis, this article has examined
the mainstreaming of the radical right in office. Given
that the state of the art has found that government par-
ticipation does not generally lead the radical right to be-
come less populist, I have proposed a theoretical refine-
ment by adding the role of leadership in government par-
ties. The main contribution of this article is its distinc-
tion between traditional and managerial party leader-
ship. The former is characterized by an adversarial strat-
egy towardmainstreamparties, while the latter favors an
accommodative strategy. I hypothesized that, compared
to the second phase when the radical right is in office un-
der traditional party leadership, levels of populism are
higher during the opposition period and lower when it is
in office under managerial party leadership.
To empirically illustrate this theoretical argument,
this article examines the case of the MCG, a regional
radical right party from Switzerland that has continu-
ously pursued a populist mobilization against increas-
ing numbers of cross-border commuters from neigh-
boring France. Based on a quantitative content analy-
sis of the party newspaper, I examined the three main
phases of the MCG’s trajectory, i.e., initial opposition
period (Phase 1), in office under traditional leadership
(Phase 2), and in office under managerial party lead-
ership (Phase 3). As compared to Phase 2, the MCG
tended to rely more frequently on populist appeals dur-
ing Phase 1 and much less so during Phase 3 This pat-
tern is in line with my hypothesis. This contribution sug-
gests that the MCG’s decline in populism is not only
attributable to government participation, but also to
the party-internal transfer of power from the traditional
leader to the managerial wing, whose representatives
subsequently adopt a more pragmatic strategy.
A limitation of this study stems from its sole use of
the MCG’s newspaper, which left aside other valuable
sources such as press releases, the paidmedia, and social
media. More reliable results would emerge from an anal-
ysis encompassing several communication channels. A re-
viewer highlighted another inferential challenge related
to the MCG’s newspaper. Given that the party mainly
seems to use Le Citoyen as a mobilization tool in the run-
up to elections and direct-democratic votes, itmay be the
case that levels of populism negatively depend on party
size. This expectation hinges on the idea that larger par-
ties may be incentivized to reduce their populist commu-
nication, since they have to appeal to a broad and there-
fore heterogeneous voter base. Due to the fact that the
MCG has continuously increased its electoral strength in
the period under investigation, it is difficult to account for
this factor in this empirical analysis. However, the party’s
recent electoral set-back offers an opportunity to exam-
ine this alternative explanation in the future.
Given that the empirical part of this article limits it-
self to a single party, some caution about the general-
izability of the main conclusions are in order. In addi-
tion to the peculiarities of the Swiss context (Mazzoleni,
2016), there is a need to more thoroughly consider the
role of government participation and party leadership
in the populism of radical right parties across Western
Europe. Hence, it is fundamental that more research fol-
low on radical right parties that have experienced the
three phases of interest. It would be particularly stim-
ulating to conduct comparative research, as such con-
tributions could focus on contextual differences. For in-
stance, it could be possible that the radical right reduces
its level of populism before entering government in coun-
tries where this party family has traditionally faced a cor-
don sanitaire (i.e., a commitment by mainstream parties
to exclude the radical right from coalition governments)
in order to detoxify its bad image.
In addition, I would like to highlight that this the-
oretical framework can be applied to populist parties
of any ideological stripe. Researchers may particularly
seek to expand their focus to the radical left, a party
family that nowadays also tends to rely heavily on pop-
ulism (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2019). An empirical examina-
tion could focus on Syriza in Greece and Podemos in
Spain, as these two parties have managed to participate
in government. This would enable scholars to analyze
whether the radical right and the radical left differ in their
reliance on populism once in office. Finally, unconven-
tional populists would represent another fascinating sub-
ject of investigation. This applies, above all, to the Five
StarMovement from Italy. It isworth noting that this case
is particularly relevant when considering the role played
by party leadership. In addition to the traditional leader-
ship under Beppe Grillo, a managerial wing has emerged
around Luigi di Maio since the party’s entrance into gov-
ernment at both the national and subnational level.
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